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EMERSON P. SCHMIDT
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES
BECAUSE capital investment is among the most volatile components
of economic activity, business cycle research has concentrated most
heavily on this aspect of economic instability. The "durable" charac-
ter of capital investment makes replacements and new capital invest-
ment postponable.
Has this focus been accompanied by inadequate research on other
lines of approach? Can business management take any effective
anticyclical steps through policies relating to the product mix, re-
search and product development, pricing, advertising, and other
factors? If so, what business policies are most effective once a con-
traction has set in? What policies during prosperous times will help
to prevent contraction from setting in? It is to these questions that
the exploration in this paper is directed.'
It has generally been assumed that when markets soften and
demand curves shift downward, there is not much that the indi-
vidual business can do to prevent such a shift. Is this assumption
valid? Is this a complete statement of the problem? Is it inevitable
that the demand curve will shift downward?
Business management does not wholly accept the assumption that
markets must be left to themselves. Conferences of businessmen,
whether within the local community or on some broader regional or
national basis, whether of a trade association or more heterogeneous
in character, are constantly concerned with "the business outlook."
Rarely do these groups meet for a day's session without some time
being set aside for a prognosis of the economic outlook. Economists
are in demand as speakers and analysts. These forecasting sessions
are among the best attended. If the speaker can make suggestions as
to how to avoid a downturn or as to what can be done to maintain
does not minimize the importance of continuity of investment. As
David McCord Wright has said: "But investment is the basic problem. Measures
to stabilize consumption (public works, unbalanced budgets, etc.) may indeed
keep the slump from getting worse. But they are after all mere first aid, that
is, if we are not just trying to smuggle socialism in by the back door. Until
growth once more gets under way and with it new investment, there cannot
be a spontaneous recovery of the private economy." Capitalism, McGraw-Hill,
1951, p. 205.
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business volume, he is listened to avidly.2 The businessman does not
regard himself wholly as a victim of blind economic forces. He
knows that he helps to shape these forces and that he has some
power to adapt his operations to them. Widespread recognition of,
and continuous alertness to, the fact that business volume may con-
tract as well as expand may serve as a stabilizing force. More and
more companies are adding economists to their staffs.
Patient, persistent, and more extensive analysis by business execu-
tives, by the trade and business press, and by business economists
of business and economic developments both within the economy
as a whole and within a specffic industry should be on the side of
greater stability. The enormous growth of business and economic
statistics provides the basis for a much better grasp of the economic
terrain, and extensive analysis and use of them may be expected
to help dampen excessive and unsustainable booms.
Business management's horizon has shifted and broadened in the
last generation. Formerly, company annual reports were largely con-
fined to accounting data with a minimum of text. Today, annual
reports, especially those of the larger and expanding companies,
generally devote considerable space to a broad range of economic
and political considerations: earnings, dividends, and reserves, in-
cluding special reserves; buyers, consumers, and markets; research
and new product development; expansion plans; and frequently
community relations. Business management experiences the tug of
many forces that affect its operations and its future. The impact of
company policies and operations upon the community where the
executives work and live is in the forefront of
Continuity of production with a minimum of fluctuations is placed
high in the field of objectives. The search for ways and means of
attaining regularity of operations ranks high.
Regardless of what evidence can be marshalled to show that man-
2Thatuniversities give more attention to training economists for business em-
ployment and that business executives utilize more economists have been sug-
gested by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. See Business
Management and Economic Analysis, 1951.
Henry S. Dennison, president of the Dennison Manufacturing Company
(which has a thirty-year record of attempting stabilization), stated before the
American Economic Association: "In sum, the central concept of sustained
growth and such ideals as dependable merchandise, man-to-man relations with
our employees, election of directors by the managerial group, mutual interests
with customers and suppliers, and fair return to investors have come to form
the pattern or frame of reference within which decisions are made." Proceed-
ings, Sixty-third Annual Meeting, American Economic Association, May 1951,
p. 99.
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agement has taken anticyclical steps, this attitude of mind on the
part of a growing number of business executives is itself a fact of
some importance. Even if the results to date are unsubstantial or
inconclusive, this does not necessarily foretell what may, or could,
be in prospect.
Seasonal and Other Short-Run Instability
Business management generally does not make the clear-cut distinc-
tion between seasonal and other short-run fluctuations, on the one
hand, and cyclical fluctuations, on the other, that is made by the
business cycle researcher. The businessman does not regard the
break between the two to be as sharp as it seems to the student of
economic instability. This may be advantageous as well as dis-
advantageous.
Considerable progress, and in many lines outstanding progress,
has been made by business management in mitigating seasonal and
other short-run instability of sales, production, and employment.
The adoption of experience rating in state unemployment insur-
ance laws has placed a premium on continuity of employment.
Savings in the form of unemployment compensation tax abatement
ranging from one or two per cent to as high as four per cent of the
payroll in some states can result from regularized employment. The
potential unemployment benefit cost per layoff runs to over $500 in
most states, and up to $800 or $900 in some states. Thus labor costs
have taken on an aspect of overhead costs that must be borne even
if employees are laid off. Private pension plans may be so designed
as to have the same effect. Engineering and economic consultants
have come into being to advise management on ways and means to
smooth out fluctuations.
To some extent, the techniques or devices helpful in eliminating
seasonal and other short-run fluctuations are useful in mitigating
longer-run fluctiiations.Experience in smoothing out short-run
cycles may pave the way for tackling the longer-run cycles, in terms
both of attitude and techniques.
The following techniques, classified into three groups—marketing
or sales policies, production policies, and personnel policies—are
among those most widely used by business management to mitigate
short-run instability.4
The literature on suggestions and experience in the mitigation of seasonal
and other short-run fluctuations is extensive. The following are typical. Herman
Feldman, Stabilizing Jobs and Wages, Harper, 1940, is a comprehensive discus-
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MARKETINGOR SALES POLICIES:
Avoid special sales drives that create production or employment
instability.
Intensify market research to probe and mitigate the underlying
causes of irregular buying.
Bring out new models and designs or adopt new packaging in
slack or dull periods.
Increase sales effort by advertising or incentives for salesmen to
overcome dull periods.
Create out-of-season uses for seasonal products.
Diversify the market geographically or otherwise to avoid sea-
S onality.
Change the product to give it an all-season appeal.
Employ a discount system, graduated or straight, to encourage
wholesalers, retailers, and buyers to place early orders.
Eliminate extreme fashion aspects.
POLICIES:
Produce parts, subassemblies, or finished products for stock during
slack periods.
Carry on continuing research in production for stock and in ware-
housing problems.
Simplify the product mix, with a view to facilitating production
for stock.
sion of business plans and techniques to regularize production, employment, and
wage income. Emerson P. Schmidt, ed., To Make Jobs More Steady and to
Make More Steady Jobs, Webb, 1942, covers over 100 case histories of indi-
vidual company plans and programs; a government publication, Guaranteed
Wages, states that it is the most comprehensive study of "stabilization oppor-
tunities and techniques" available. Employment Stabilization, National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, 1948, discusses the advantages and problems inherent in
employment stabilization, fixes responsibility for program action, appraises cur-
rent studies, and evaluates prospects. Ernest Dale, Annual Wages and Employ-
mentment Stabilization Techniques, American Management Association, 1945,
has a full and comprehensive analysis of employment stabilization devices and
techniques, and discusses the relation of steadier jobs to guaranteed wages.
Sam A. Lewisohn, Ernest C. Draper, John R. Commons, and Don D. Lescohier,
Can Business Prevent Unemployment? Knopf, 1925,isa pioneer study of
seasonal and cyclical countermeasures. Simon Kuznets, Seasonal Variations in
Industn,' and Trade, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1928, sets forth
methodology for measuring and comparing seasonal variations and provides
extensive analysis of these variations in numerous industries. Sustaining Pros-
perity, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1953, outlines for businesss
management a series of concrete steps and policies to help mitigate fluctuations.
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Diversify the product mix, developing, slack-period lines.
Carry on maintenance, repair, and construction work in slack
periods.
Spread out orders at the peak.
Meet peak demands by special production-incentive systems.
Charge unemployment compensation costs to departments respon-
sible for the layoffs.
Contract work out to avoid peaks.
Intensify production planning and budgeting for twelve or more
months ahead, with a view to eliminating shortages of supplies and
components.
PERSONNEL POLICIES:
Recruit people with more versatility arid flexibility to ease shifting
from slack to busy departments.
Train employees for more than one task.
Transfer employees from slack to busy departments.
Centralize all hiring and layoffs in one office.
Use slack periods for training and retraining personnel.
Schedule vacations and retirements during slack periods.
Develop a "flying squadron," "utility crew," or "extra gang" to
meet temporary department peaks.
Meet peak demands by a special production-incentive system.
Hire part-time people, especially students and others not wanting
full-time work.
Use a flexible workweek with stable weekly pay.
Develop arrangements with one or more other employers to
borrow and lend employees (systematic dovetailing).
Examination of the publications listed in footnote 4 shows that
all of these techniques and devices have found extensive use. A
study of the case histories discloses much exploration and experi-
mentation, many ingenious adaptations, and, in many cases, revolu-
tionary changes overcoming climatic obstacles (to year-round con-
struction, for example), irregularity in raw material supplies, or
instability of demand. Common practices of today were regarded as
wholly impractical a generation ago, except by the few pioneers
found both in industry and in a few universities, particularly the
University of Wisconsin.5 Knowledge of these accomplishments
See, particularly, Lewisohn, Draper, Commons, and Lescohier, op.cit., and
references therein.
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should help to keep open the question of how management can
approach the admittedly more difficult task of ironing out the longer-
run fluctuations in investment and in the general level of economic
activities.
While the evidence is far from clear, there is some reason to
believe that seasonal declines reinforce the cumulative process of
cyclical declines and that this in turn slows down seasonal recoveries.
If this view has any validity, it strengthens the case for a strong
management effort to mitigate seasonal instability.8
The usefulness of these three sets of policies in mitigating the
longer-run cyclical fluctuations depends upon many factors (an
important one may be the success with which governmental mone-
tary and fiscal policies are applied). The effectiveness of these
proven short-run policies can be both overemphasized and under-
emphasized in meeting the longer-run and more severe economic
fluctuations. One business executive put the matter this way: "After
we cut our eye teeth in meeting the seasonal layoff problems we
found ourselves in a problem-solving mood to tackle the depression
problem."
Because of the greater importance of the longer-run instability
and because the literature on techniques and policies for meeting
shorter-run fluctuations is extensive and readily available, discussion
will now turn to the more basic problem—indirect management
approaches to the regularization of business investment.7
The Individual-Company Approach andBusinessCycle Theory
One's estimate of the usefulness of the company approach to the
mitigation of the business cycle depends on many factors, among
the most important of which may be some knowledge of what
individual companies have done and what theory of business cycle
causation one holds.
This paper provides some information and evidence of company
contracyclical policies and programs. Some companies have made
outstanding progress. Many companies, of course, have a high
6Inthe period since the end of World War II, seasonal variations of the
prewar type have not taken place in a number of industries. The strong demand
pressure may partly account for this development. It might be worth while to
compare recent seasonal variations with the findings of Kuznets, op.cit., to see
what other forces have been at work in reducing seasonal fluctuations.
7Forsome counsel on how management can prepare itself against volume
decline, see James C. Olson, "Is Your Company Prepared for Rough Weather?"
Harvard Business Review, autumn 1947, p. 595.
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degree of stability because of the income inelasticity of demand for
their products or services. These latter cases do not concern us here.
In some cases, the achievements are due more to the march of
science, discovery, and invention than to a carefully planned contra-
cyclical program. In other cases companies, and in a few cases entire
industries, have studied the nature of their product demand, their
markets, and the factors that caused previous difficulties. This has
led to policies or programs that make company operations less
vulnerable to (or in) cyclical declines.8 The lines of approach vary
greatly from company to company, some relying chiefly on a single
policy but most of them using a combination of policies.
The area of discretionary executive decision and policy making
includes such matters as price policy; the product mix; research and
new product development, including geographical and other diver-
sification; contracyclical products; demand studies; sales effort, in-
cluding advertising; inventory as to quantities and pricing; financial
structure; and still others. Some have moved from business fore-
casting to demand analysis, to attempts to manipulate
After reading what follows, few wifi deny that American business
executives have taken a considerable number of significant contra-
cyclical steps to make their operations more stable. But does this
create greater stability of employment, income, production, and
investment throughout the economy as a whole? Even after exam-
ining what has been done, readers are likely to come to varying
8Theoverbuilding and excessive debt creation in the hotel industry in the
1920's followed by all-but-universal default in the 1930's induced the industry
to engage in a study and self-analysis that, it is generally agreed within the
industry, placed the business on a much sounder and less vulnerable basis.
Similar industry studies might make a major contribution to contracyclical
capital formation and reduce the severity of depressions. See American Hotel
Association, The Future Outlook of the Hotel Industry, 1946.
Concentration on the instability of investment, because its large cyclical
fluctuations make it seem to many an "originating cause," may account for the
constantly recurring conclusions that business management can contribute little
to economic stability and that the business of business (indeed, in the public
interest) is to maximize earnings. One of the most recent negative conclusions
grew out of the Minnesota capital investment study. A participant states:
"Management investment policies are so closely geared to realized profits that
such stability-promoting proposals as slack-period plant construction and equip-
ment purchases and conscious inventory stabilization simply do not seem to fit
into the pattern of thinking. The appeal such proposals might have in the way
of lowering the cost of acquiring plant and equipment and inventories is over-
shadowed by the greater risk believed to be involved in making commitments
that are not geared to profits already made or easily in sight." Walter W. Heller,
"The Anatomy of Investment Decisions," Harvard Business Review, March
1951, p. 95.
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conclusions depending on bow they view the causes of economic
fluctuations.
Questions like this will arise: If all companies took on essentially
depression-proof lines, for example, so that during a period of
capacity operation 50 per cent of each company's sales were in these
lines, would a depression be less steep and prolonged than if one
half of the companies were engaged exclusively in producing lines
with high income inelasticity and the other half were turning out
producers' and other goods with high income elasticity?
If the impact of a decline is spread broadly across the economy,
does this inhibit the spiral effect? If so, how?
An individual company may advertise itself out of a depression
or prevent a depression from overtaking it by superior sales effort.
This may merely increase its market share at the expense of its
competitors with no benefit to the economy as a whole. If its com-
petition is stimulated to follow its lead and this broad, vigorous
sales effort overcomes spending timidity and maintains or expands
sales, it may be possible to show that a cyclical decline is arrested,
or merely that sales of other industries have declined.
One company, by cutting prices and concentrating on cheaper
lines, may increase its volume and net income. If all companies, that
is, a whole industry, followed similar policies, would this inhibit
the downward spiral, or might it defer buying by raising widespread
anticipation of trouble ahead or still greater bargains to come?
These are the types of questions that will come to the reader's
mind as he reads what follows. It would be possible to set up various
models that would answer these questions. While such model build-
ing is important for certain purposes, the numerous variables that
would have to be embraced might make the models of not much
more than academic interest.
It should be noted, in passing, that questions of similar type arise
under public policy for mitigating the business cycle. What is to be
stabilized is not even agreed upon. Should the goal be to stabilize
the price level? If so, what price level? Or employment? Or both? If
both, will these goals collide? Will public works drive up material
and labor costs and thereby delay the recovery of private invest-
ment? If taxes are abated because of a threatening downturn in
business, will the announcement of the abatement reduce velocity
of money turnover and increase spending timidity? If deficit spend-
ing is to be resorted to, how will the authorities determine the size
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of the needed spending? And the timing? Will Congress and public
opinion tolerate a deficit of sufficient size to accomplish the job?
Will such spending restore balanced private investment or merely
take up the slack of existing capacity? If public opinion accepts the
deficit, but considers that it will mean a steady deterioration in the
value of the dollar, what will happen to the government bond
market and how will the deficit be financed? What are the implica-
tions for postdepression stability of the liquid asset creation growing
out of the deficit spending? Can deficit spending be properly timed
under our complicated governmental structure?
To raise these questions is enough to suggest that any public
contracyclical program opens a number of important problems not
too different from those raised by a private contracyclical program.1°
Recognizing the difficulties of evaluation, we shall now turn to a
review of what business executives and business economists have
to say about their experience in working upon and thinking about
the problem of the company approach to regularization of output
and investment.
Indirect Regularization
In order to get the benefit of industrial experience for this study,
the author sent some 200 letters to business economists and industrial
executives asking them to examine in terms of their own experience,
with a view to mitigating longer-run instability, the following, areas
of managerial discretion:
1. Price policy adaptations to changing phases of the cycle;
2. Product-mix changes to fit changing phases of the cycle;
3. The timing and acceleration of research and innovation, new
products, etc.;
4. The volume and timing of sales effort, including salesmen,
advertising, and market research (this item is closely related to
nos. 2 and 3);
5. Developing supplementary lines that either are more or less
depression-proof or have a different cycle;
6. Wage policy, including personnel administration, i.e., shifts in
retirement age;
7. Financial structure, debt versus equity, short-term versus inter-
mediate loans, commercial credit;
8. Inventory pricing policy and rate of purchases;
10See,for example, the discussions in A. C. Hart, Money, Debt, and Eco-
nomic Activity, Prentice-Hall, 1948, particularly on pp. 415-438, 459-514.
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9. Cost accounting, i.e., cost accounting on a historical cost basis
exaggerates profit figures and profit anticipations;
10. Depreciation policy; and
11. Special financial reserves for lean years.
Three specffic questions were asked:
Which of the above eleven areas of policy-making do you regard
as offering business management the most promising line of ap-
proach?
What do you think the individual company can do in these areas?
Could you give me some actual illustrations of what companies
with which you have been associated, or are now associated, or are
familiar, have done in these areas?
Some fifty responses that revealed some systematic consideration
and experience in this general area were received. Much of what
follows is quoted from the responses and much of the comment is
based on them.1'
Negative Reactions
From both business executives and business economists a number
of negative reactions were received. The economists raised ques-
tions of both practical and theoretical difficulties as well as of basic
philosophy. The business executives who were negative came to the
conclusion that little or nothing could be done by the individual
company partly because of numerous government policies (taxation,
rules on depreciation, compulsory distribution of earnings) and
partly on the basis of labor union rigidities. In many cases, their
reactions were based on the view that the company is subject to
competitive and market forces that severely restrict managerial
discretion.'2
The economist for a life insurance company, who, however, was
not wholly negative, expressed his reservation in these words:
"Businessmen, it seems to me, ...shouldbe expected to act like
11 In sending out these letters, the expectation was that the responses would
serve as a guide and furnish illustrative materials and cases for the preparation
of this paper. The responses indicated a high level of economic understanding,
a richness of thought and experience, and a sense of challenge• and responsi-
bility. In order to convey to the reader the character and quality of the
responses, and because in this preliminary exploration it is of some importance
to indicate the reactions and experience of business executives and business
economists, quotation from the letters is relied upon primarily, and much more
so than was originally intended.
12Inaddition, many of the respondents questioned the feasibility of man-
agerial action in one or more of the eleven areas of policy previously mentioned.
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businessmen. The effort to mitigate cyclical fluctuations gets on
dubious ground if and when it makes them act or think of acting
like something other than businessmen. In saying this, I mean that
businessmen should be expected to try to maximize profit in the
broadest sense, which of course does not necessarily mean each day
viewed separately. I am not sure that mitigation of cyclical fluctua-
tions and maximization of profit even in the broad sense are com-
patible within the same breast at all times."
This leaves open the question of short-run versus long-run maxi-
mization of earnings. It views the businessman in a somewhat
narrower focus than he generally views himself.
A consulting economist, with extensive experience, concluded
that the competitive enterprise élan precludes management con-
sideration along the lines indicated in my letter. Here are his words:
"I do not believe that a bona fide competitive enterprise system as a
whole can do anything much to mitigate the impact of business
cycles on itself. One can argue that the exercise of restraint on up-
swings is likely to dampen the subsequent downswing, but such
restraint is not in conformance with the principles of competition
and is in direct conflict with the spirit if not the letter of antitrust
legislation. Competition means expansion at the risk of periodi.c
overexpansion. It is the function of government, including primarily
the monetary authorities, to prevent overexpansion. It would seem
suicidal to saddle the enterprise system with responsibility for
dampening economic fluctuations, when to do so is clearly beyond
its power and also contrary to the social-economic environment in
which it operates."
This view was expressed perhaps even more forcibly by the econ-
omist of a steel producer. His views merit quotation at
I come up with the conclusion that in your place I would ask
to be excused from writing a paper on what an individual firm can
do to mitigate cyclical fluctuations in the volume of its business. The
reason ...isthat it is my considered judgment that there is abso-
lutely nothing that any individual firm can do to mitigate business
cycles that is worth mentioning. I think that time spent in trying
to formulate policies for individual firms to follow in the hope that
pursuit of such policies will mitigate business cycles is time that is
wasted. Each of the 11 policies...[isa policy] to which every
individual firm should pay attention in developing the growth of
its company. Indeed in a properly functioning economy they would
be competitively compelled to pay attention to such matters. But the
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hope that such policies would mitigate business cycles is, I believe, a
completely forlorn one.
But if any one firm in a period of boom fails to make the
expansion otherwise competitively indicated, the net result is that
it makes such expansion on the part of its competitor the cheaper
and more easily effected. When the...depressioncomes along, the
competitor who did not restrain himself has better equipment, more
customers ... atthe lowered cost by reason of the restraint of the
given producer. In short, all that this kind of...effortleads to is to
put the 'cooperating' employer at a progressively greater competi-
tive disadvantage. In other words, he is just putting himself out of
business and leaving the field to those 'recalcitrants' who are per-
fectly happy to produce the boom and the bust!
I don't see how individual businesses can, in the light of the
events just illustrated, do anything to mitigate business cycles with-
out embracing each other in some sort of an enforceable limitation
of production in [a] time supposed to be boom. This would be the
road to some sort of fascism—and I want none of it."
This reaction, from an economist who regards major cycles as
essentially monetary phenomena, is based on a strong conviction as
to the desirability and actuality of the competitive character of our
economy.
The economist of a private research organization, although not
so negative as some of the others, expressed his reservation in these
words: "I have always doubted whether the individual business
concern, acting independently, can exert very much effect upon the
level or rate of change in general economic activity; and collusive
activity. .. thatmight yield substantial benefit is likely to be illegal—
to say nothing of the possibility that it might have ...unfavorable
structural by-products."
Part of this same thought was reported by an economist associated
with a motor vehicle manufacturer: "It has been shown in the past
that many firms have been highly successful in avoiding violent
fluctuations through the adoption of policies such as outlined in
your letter. In a great many of these instances, their success, how-
ever, seems to have been based upon an alteration of their competi-
tive situation. Thus, the gain of one may have been to a large extent
the loss of others, and there was no discernible effect upon the
national volume of business.
The economist of a fat and oil products manufacturer, while not
wholly negative as to individual management actions, regards the
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use of credit as the key to cyclical stability:"I assume that a
cyclical peak in production and trade is experienced when people
have been investing larger sums than they can continue to invest,
or people have been spending more money for consumption than
they can continue to spend, or when expenditure for political
purposes has been larger than the authorities can maintain. In prac-
tice all three of these types of expenditure are varied almost simul-
taneously. The 'reason why expenditure in the first two of these
categories is reduced ordinarily is that accumulated savings or
credit have been used to finance expenditure and no longer can be
or will be employed for that purpose.
These skeptical views may be summarized in the following
propositions:
1. The individual business unit is primarily the victim or the
beneficiary of market and competitive forces and pressures over
which it has little or no substantial control (and many add that this
is just as it should be).
2. Regularization efforts by the individual business unit are not
in keeping with the basic drive of the entrepreneur or the spirit
underlying a competitive private enterprise economy.
8. Antidepression action would require concerted action by mem-
bers of an industry, which would violate not only the spirit but the
letter of our antitrust legislation.
4. The power of an individual business to take action against
depression involves some insulation from the rigors of competition
and a move toward some preferred position, or some degree of
monopoly position.
5. There is danger in accepting the idea that business can over-
come the cycle when in fact this is beyond its power.
6. The gain of one company in achieving a stabilization program
is likely to be at the expense of other producers or other parts of
the economy.
These reactions raise questions of fact, of semantics, of concep-
tions, of ideology, and of executive motivations. These matters are
discussed more fully in other papers in this series. They are not
typical of the responses But they do express considera-
tions of first importance.
Fora much less pessimistic conclusion, see Adolph C. Abramson, "Business
Management Action against Depression," The Future of Business Research,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1949.
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The author, being reasonably familiar with the literature on miti-
gating seasonal and other short-run instability, sees a marked
similarity between these negative approaches and the pessimistic
views generally taken a generation ago in regard to short-run in-
stability. The accomplishments of management in mitigating short-
run instability should at least keep open the possibility that this
negative approach may not be wholly valid. It must be recognized,
however, that substantially mitigating market declines of longer-run
instability raises difficulties of a magnitude and character not en-
countered by management in attempting to overcome short-run in-
stability. Furthermore, the dollar savings of short-run continuity of
operation generally are recurring, tangible, and measurable. Savings
made by anticyclical policies are in doubt, uncertain, and not neces-
sarily recurring.
Of the less skeptical responses received, few indicated any out-
standing conviction that the cyclical problem had been solved. A
considerable number stated that positive action taken had made the
company less vulnerable, and in some cases substantially less vul-
nerable. The degree to which the problem has been given considera-
tion and actions have been taken promises a continued lively interest
in further exploration. If an extensive literature of both an analytic
and guidepost character were created in the period ahead, this could
be expected to lead to considerable practical exploration and experi-
mentation by business executives, economists, and consultants.
Adaptive Price Policy and Product Mix
While a considerable number of respondents emphasized adaptive
price policy in general as of importance in mitigating the cycle,
when it came to discussing actual achievements and the practical
problems and limitations, they were generally, but not always, less
confident.
This is not too surprising since, upon more mature consideration,
a good many economic theorists now express considerable uncer-
tainty as to the wisdom of price (wage) flexibility. Joel Dean, al-
though recognizing that a company should have a cyclical price
policy, makes the sweeping statement that "Much publicity has
been given to the thought that flexible prices would help to cut short
the descent into depressions and reduce fluctuations in business
activity. Nevertheless, there is little support for this idea either in
accepted economic theory or in
14JoelDean, Managerial Economics, Prentice-HaIl, 1951, p. 466.
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Even if this is a valid generalization, it still leaves open the ques-
tion in the case of a specific industry, a specific company, or a
specific product. During booms, differential price movements are
substantial, and it would be surprising if all such relationships are
adaptable to a period of softer markets.15
The margin available for price reduction, especially if the over-
head costs are spread over a reduced volume during declines (full
current-cost pricing), is not very large. Average net profit per dollar
of sales in prosperous 1929 was about 5 cents. Even in peak years
one third or more of the active corporations make no net profits. In
1929, out of 456,000 active corporations 41 per cent earned no net
income. In 1948 the proportion was more than one third.
The earlier view that depressions may be caused, and in any case
deepened, by "sticky prices" set by the "concentrated monopolistic
power" of the "administered price" industries is no longer generally
held. Alfred C. Neal has made a careful study of the relationship
among costs, prices, and concentration during the period 1929 to
1933, the iow point of the depression. He found that there was a very
close connection between price declines and cost declines and each
in turn showed little or no correlation with concentration. He con-
cluded: "We should expect concentration to have had some influence
upon prices, but this effect cannot be found by examining price
behavior....Itis to be found instead in the behavior of prices
relative to cost. Pricing in concentrated industries is based upon
costs, and apparently these industries pass along lower costs for
materials and labor about as well as non-concentrated industries."16
This research finding is confirmed by most businessmen. Nor are
they confident generally that price cutting will stimulate markets.
An executive of a farm-implement-producing company states:
"The majority of businesses fluctuate in accordance with a general
fluctuation in the over-all business cycle and from my own manu-
facturing and selling experience, reduced volume very adversely
affects your costs and most businesses are not in the position to lower
15 In the case of manufactured products, management has, of course, price
decisions to make. Even if prices are held rigid when markets soften, this itself
is a price policy. Price changes may be made to conform to changes in the price
of substitutes, or in the general price level, or to maintain the "market share,"
or to reflect changes in costs. Costs themselves may be variously defined to
include incremental costs, standard full costs, or current full costs. These do not
exhaust the possibilities.
16 "Pricing Aspect of Business Cycle History," Pricing Problems and the
Stabilization of Prosperity, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1947,
p. 37.
333PROMOTING STEADIER OUTPUT AND SALES
prices, in my opinion, during a period of reduced volume. While.
competitive pressure may drive prices down some during a period
of that kind, I seriously doubt that this offers... anopportunity to
reverse the cycle of the individual business to a point where it
becomes an answer to the problem."
A similar line of thinking is expressed by an executive of a food
processing company: "The pricing policy must necessarily be related
to the product and the market, taking full cognizance of the general
practices in the industry. Many products can be sold on a relatively
fixed-price basis, and the price is set to yield a satisfactory margin
when related to an anticipated volume of business. If for any reason
the volume is not forthcoming, management may reduce the price in
the hope of attracting more buyers, or it may decide to use a greater
part of the margin for sales effort or advertising to accomplish the
same purpose. As a general practice, I do not believe it is wise to
change the price of products which generally sell at a fixed price
in order to smooth out seasonal variations in volume or declines in
volume which may be of relatively short duration. Frequent price
changes on a fixed-price product lead to less confidence on the part
of customers, particularly in a buyer's market. Other types of prod-
ucts are generally sold on the basis of competitive pricing. In such
cases the concern must be able and willing to make price conces-
sions, or see its plants operate at a low rate of capacity."
The president of a life insurance company with considerable
industrial experience states: "... pricemargins should tend to be
made higher as the business cycle moves upward and lower as it
moves downward. Competition probably works toward this in any
event, but even if it did not, in periods of depression the margin of
profit on sales should be low in order to stimulate sales. I realize, of
course, that this plays havoc with profits because the volume of
sales will be low at the same time the margin of profit on them is
also low."
The economist of a paper-products-manufacturing company says:
'Prices in a competitive business will naturally follow the cycle, but
this may increase rather than reduce the swings. Holding prices
down during the boom may help to enlarge the market before the
depression sets in, but to reduce prices during the boom is likely to
be taken as a sign of market weakness and as reason for waiting for
further cuts. It takes fear of rising prices to induce increased buying.
•..TheRobinson Patman Act tends to prevent experimentation
with reduced prices in limited areas."
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A banking economist puts his conclusion in these words: "The-
oretically, an anticyclical price policy would call for high prices in
periods of prosperity and high demand, and for lower prices in
periods of recession and reduced demand. The higher prices would
to some extent have the effect of reducing consumer demand when
it tends to be high or when excessive, and the lower prices should
stimulate demand when it tends to be inadequate. As a practical
matter, however, there are serious difficulties in the way of such a
policy, especially for very large concerns. While such concerns can
benefit, from a public relations point of view, by reducing their
prices in a period of business recession, they are almost certain to
be accused of gouging and inordinate greed if they raise their prices
materially in a period of prosperity. Furthermore, the rapid growth
in their profits in prosperous years is usually taken by the labor
unions as an open invitation to demand large increases in wages and
other benefits at the time when the employers are in the weakest
position to resist; and if they do not resist, the result is to increase
production costs, which makes it more difficult to reduce prices in
ensuing periods of recession. Perhaps the best policy for prominent
concerns may be to follow their smaller competitors in raising prices
and to take the lead in reducing prices. (Even then, however, they
cannot expect to be immune to criticism as, in the latter case, they
may be accused of seeking to destroy their smaller competitors.)"
Adapting prices to changing market conditions is closely related
to changes in types of products offered for sale. For companies that
manufacture or distribute numerous product lines of varying grades
and prices, experience shows that there is considerable variation in
the behavior of the different products over the course of a business
cycle. It is, of course, good business management to anticipate and
to be sensitive to shifts in taste and demand. Can the individual
company reduce its vulnerability to cyclical declines by advance
planning of its line of products?
A building supply manufacturer at the present time (1951) is not
even producing his less expensive lines. It has been his company's
policy, when markets soften, to promote existing low-priced lines
and to introduce new low-priced lines. The other lines are priced
on what the company calls a quality basis, whereas the low-priced
lines are highly competitive, and in postwar years have been re-
served for the period when sales resistance occurs.
At the time of writing, this company is concentrating on a fiber
board used for insulation in industrial construction. As new capital
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investment declines, repair and modernization materials are expected
to be in greater demand, and these will be promoted. Should a major
depression develop, the company has made plans for vigorous
emphasis of repair and modernization materials.
The president of a rubber products company recognizes the
advantage of changing product mix in the several phases of the
cycle, but views management as being more led than leading: "We
believe that the cycle determines the product-mix, not the reverse.
All companies try to sell all their products at all times, but the
consumers' ability to defer purchase until better times changes the
mix. Also, under depression conditions, the demand for lower-quality
merchandise, which offers buyers with iow incomes something that
will tide them over, will inevitably increase against the higher-priced
lines, which represent better value but take too large a portion of
reduced take-home pay."
An executive of a food-processing company states:"I believe
management must be alert to changes in the demand for specific
products. If a product sells to a wide cross-section of the public, it
is necessary to appraise the effect of lower mass purchasing power
and to determine whether the product can be changed... tosell at
a lower price and still meet the needs of people who want it. With
the next upswing of the cycle, the trimmings which were removed
may be restored, adding to the popular appeal of the product. How-
ever, I do not believe that a standard product should be cheapened—
certainly not where its utility is materially impaired. Rather, a
similar product might be produced in a lower price range."
In the depression of the 1930's the mechanical refrigerator indus-
try brought out the so-called strip box, a cheap variation with few
features and little ornamentation, and thereby stimulated sales.
The economist of a large retail establishment expresses his com-
pany's experiences in these words: "In retailing, we are constantly
changing emphasis on price lines to fit conditions as we see them.
The problem is to keep a proper balance and to know when to push
the next higher price lines or the next lower price lines. For balanced
production, the right product-mix is very important. Many com-
panies do not think about this kind of protection to operations until
they are actually confronted with a vanishing demand for the main
product. It is not easy to change price policies in manufacturing;
but if the product lines are properly adjusted to fit the mass,
medium and high priced markets, it is often possible to make rela-
tively smooth adjustments when conditions are unfavorable."
336PROMOTING STEADIER OUTPUT AND SALES
An economist with considerable experience in endeavoring to
insulate a number of companies against depression's impact states:
"Changing the product-mix with the changing phases of the cycle
is most challenging and, though inapplicable to a great number of
businesses, has a very considerable scope. Certainly a business that
manufactures a considerable number of lines should know which
sells best in periods of depression and which in periods of activity,
and be able to handle its business on this basis. As I see it, the
problem is maintaining sales so as to minimize the reduction in
employment. I presume that there is a considerable flexibility in
many businesses which enables them to keep their organizations
operating by accommodation to the particular market situation that
arises from the fluctuations of the cycle."
An economist associated with the textile trade, basing his com-
ment on close observation, says: "On the down side of the inventory
cycle it may be possible, through bringing out lower priced mer-
chandise, to create new demand and enlarge the firm's total output,
thus holding up employment. A wholly different product would, of
course, stimulate employment. Even with a cheaper product, how-
ever, the chances are that demand would not increase substantially
until the price stabilized. All buyers wait for the bottom. If it is a
new product it is possible that demand could be developed even
during a period of falling prices. Manufacturers have...given
some, but perhaps not enough, attention to this problem. As a
practical matter there are, of course, limitations to the number of
lines that a company can carry if its lines are already well balanced
and have pretty wide coverage."
These quotations, pius the analysis by Alfred Neal and the fact
that for the most part American business relates prices closely to
cost, indicate some of the possibilities and difficulties in following
adaptive pricing and product-mix policies when markets soften, If
there is merit in these ideas, as seems to be the case, it suggests the
necessity of advance
General price and wage cutting when depression threatens may
not prevent depression because, while this will cut costs, it may
also cut incomes, leaving the general situation just where it was
before the cuts. It may also raise anticipations of further cuts. How-
17Manyprices appear more stable and rigid than they are in fact. During
periods of soft markets concealed price concessions may be made. Changes may
be made in discounts, guarantees, cancellation and returnable privileges, and
advertising allowances. When markets boom the quoted price may remain the
same while the effective price changes in terms of the other conditions of sale.
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ever, selective price and wage adjustments on a more or less con-
tinuous basis (rather than after fear and timidity have taken over)
may do much to continue to clear markets. During booms the short-
lived excessive demand may push some prices and wages upward
and out of line. When demand threatens to recede, a careful exam-
ination of costs, prices, and product lines may indicate possibilities
of tapping new but lower levels of demand and thereby mitigate
the tendency toward recession.
In the early stages of the depression of the 1930's, in some cases
both wages and prices were actually raised as volume declined and
overhead costs were spread over smaller output. This was self-
defeating. An electric supply producer announced a substantial
price increase after the 1929 decline was in full swing. The economist
of this company now states, "Never again will we do that."
For each business concern to review constantly its price policies
in terms of counteracting these alternate booms and depressions
would require a high order of business statesmanship and economic
analysis. Since at the time the executive never knows whether a
major depression or merely a minor wave is in prospect, he faces
some difficulty, although forecasting, beyond that done by manage-
ment of necessity in any case, is not necessary.'8
During the latter stages of the war and after V-J Day, general
depression was widely and persistently predicted, especially in
Washington. One factor that no doubt helped prevent general
depression was the steady readjustments that took place in plant
after plant and industry after industry. The fur industry was in
serious difficulty in 1946. The same was true of the jewelry industry,
and certain soft goods lines. But as each industry experienced dif-
ficulties in maintaining output, certain production and price read-
justments were promptly instituted and this helped to maintain
markets. Indeed, a new term, "rotation adjustment," came into
vogue, suggesting the successive readjustments that took place.
Possibly this adaptive behavior helped to prevent a decline of the
whole economy. This may have considerable significance for the
business executive in indicating an area for adaptive policy.
The degree to which markets are maintained and strengthened
will determine the stimulation of maintenance, replacements, and
possibly new capital investment.
18Abramsonhas pointed out that contracyclical business policy management
need not rest on business forecasting. op.cit., p. 36.
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Accelerating Research, Innovation, and New Products
American business is research-minded in terms of new processes
and technology, new products, and market expansion and develop-
ment. Can the individual company through its research and new-
product policy mitigate its cyclical vulnerability?
Most of the respondents emphasize that research is not something
that can be turned on and off like a spigot. They believe that sus-
tained research pays off handsomely and that it reduces the impact
of depression. But they tend to question the possibility of effective
timing to offset cyclical fluctuations. Many stress the advantage and
ease of introducing new products when markets are strong.
The economist of a paper products manufacturing company,
which for a generation has emphasized new product development
as a contracyclical device, said that the effort has not been entirely
successful. He put it in these words: "If one has a new product,
one wants to market it ahead of competitors; and the time of the
next depression is likely to be unknown. To the extent, however, that
research helps to keep the business growing and healthy and that
expansion of capacity is guided by secular rather than by cyclical
growth, the secular growth should help to offset any cyclical
decline."
The economist for a rubber products company emphasized the
difficulty of introducing new products when markets in general are
soft and uncertain. Although recognizing the possible value of better
timing, he said: "I think most business managers would prefer to
introduce the new product at a time when market demand was high,
in order to get it firmly established in the market ahead of competi-
tion. Thus on the whole, I believe that new product development
and introduction of new products has in the past accentuated rather
than ameliorated the swings in the business cycles."
The economist of another rubber products company takes the
opposite view: "... itis frequently more successful to launch a new
or improved product during the periods of business recession than
at other times, because the relatively smaller amount of promo-
tional effort at such times allows these innovations to stand out by
contrast."
Such contradictory conclusions may, of course, be valid in terms
of different experiences, products, and periods.
The economist for a building products manufacturer states that
the company's research people will not admit that it is practical to
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time research to help offset the cycle. However, experience does not
completely verify this negative conclusion. The economist points out
that the several new products and product improvements are gen-
erally at varying stages of development, and that it is always pos-
sible to select particular research projects for additional acceleration.
This company has broad over-all anticyclical policies of which new
product research is only one.
An executive of a food-processing company, with exceptionally
extensive research experience, puts the matter in this way: "It is
possible that the timing of research and innovation may be con-
trolled to some extent so as to have new or improved products ready
at the opportune time. However, I am inclined to believe that once
a new product is ready for the market, it should be offered without
too much delay. I might say that we have had success in launching
new products in the depths of the depression as well as in the post-
war boom. The important thing is to have the innovations and new
products coming along. Gaining a market for a new product is
difikult under any circumstances and isa part of the growth
process."
Philip D. Reed, chairman of the board, General Electric Com-
pany, doubts the possibility and wisdom of holding back major
innovations: "Any self-imposed 'automatic' checks which would
deter expansion in periods of high demand would be bound to place
us ultimately at a serious competitive disadvantage and it seems to
me that any national or industry-wide checks of this nature might
well delay the introduction of new products to the American public.
For example, would the country really be better off if all capital
expenditures for the production of television had been deferred until
the time of the next business
Similar views were expressed by most of the respondents; oniy a
few rejected the idea completely. Many respondents believed that
new product research pays off in terms of mitigating cyclical de-
clines. A paper and paper products manufacturer with a definite
anticyclical policy on new products states: "Within the last month
we ourselves have increased our research appropriation by ... more
than 30 per cent. Three times in the last thirty odd years, as a result
of research and development, we have made major changes in our
basic lines of pro.ducts with the result that our operating ratio over-
all has been better than the industry in times of recession or major
"Volume and Stability of Private Investment," Hearings before the Joint
Committee on the Economic Report, 81st Congress, 1949, part 2.
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depression. Today in the field of standard white papers we are not
making any of the grades that we were making twenty years ago.
We introduced a new line in 1932 and not more than 5 per cent of
our total volume consists of grades we were making fifteen years ago
••. ourown increase in research activity in all of its phases is in-
tended to give us new or better products or lower costs, or all of
these, when demand slackens."
A chemical manufacturer, substantially free from cyclical difficul-
ties, expresses somewhat the same view in these words: "This policy
of product diversification has been in effect for a great many years
anä is based upon the principle that business health and stability is
most readily obtained when there is diversification of product lines
and sales outlets."
Another chemical producer, one of the leaders in the proportion
of the sales dollar devoted to research, puts the matter this way:
wouldsay that we are just becoming aware of the timing of real
efforts on new products. There is a cliché in our industry which says
that the timing from laboratory to market on a new product is seven
years. We are constantly engaged in trying to speed up that cycle
and are beginning to give more emphasis to watching the product
after its initial production to see when it is ripe for real promotion.
There is, of course, a period—sometimes too protracted—in which a
product is finding acceptance, customer-by-customer, in its new
application. There is a certain psychological moment when itis
ready for all-out sales effort, and we are now consciously trying to
time that so that our advertising and field sales forces can be brought
into play neither too early nor too late."
The executive of a farm implement manufacturing firm explains
that his company has kept ahead of his industry through research
development. He has this to say: "During the last depression in our
own business the only departments that were not substantially re-
duced in personnel were our research and new development depart-
ments. A check that was made during that period indicates that we
were granted more patents than any of our competitors and I think
much of our gain positionwise in the industry that followed can be
attributed to the aggressive policy pursued during that period of
accelerating research, but I would not say that it had given us any
particular assistance during the depression period. It paid off, in
other words, after 1935 when we and all other businesses began to
recover."
Several respondents emphasized their advantage in coupling new-
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product research and cost-reducing research. An economist puts the
matter in these words: "Similarly, innovations in processes—particu-
larly those of cost-saving types—would be most useful and necessary
in periods of recession. And if new equipment is required it could
presumably be obtained most easily and cheaply, and with benefit
to the economy, at such times."
The same idea was expressed by the economist of a large banking
investment group with experience in helping clients: "There should
be new products to be ready when present lines sag in volume, and
these should include less expensive models, and models with new
economy features for introduction in times of cyclical downturn.
These can be very helpful in keeping the sales force full of drive
when sales are hard to secure. Here I think that this applies to both
consumers' and producers' goods as there should be many oppor-
tunities to sell labor-saving, material-saving, and cost-saving produc-
tive equipment even when the business curves are pointing down-
ward. This would have the advantage of increasing demand for
metals, which must be held up if business is to be good."
The economist of a fat and oil products company questions the
possibility of useful acceleration, but also sees the function of
research as cost-reducing: "I would be reluctant to work in any
enterprise where my colleagues did not do everything they could at
all times to provide the best products at a proper price for their
customers. I do not see how one can accelerate research, innovation,
and sales effort in a company where the men are doing these things
to the limit of their capacities at all times. I think the managers of
any company who are not utilizing capacity in respect to the
performance of these functions will lose out in the competitive
struggle. I have seen this happen so many times that I do not
believe that it is possible for a competent management to accelerate
selling effort or research because sales are being reduced. Their
role is to reduce costs and increase efficiency at all times."
This brief review may be somewhat inconclusive. It does suggest
the possibility that widespread research on a sustained basis might
help to make the economy less vulnerable to depression. It further
suggests that if the business executive once sees the role of research
and new-product development in this light, his own longer-run self-
interest may induce him to support research appropriations and
expenditures on a more sustained basis.
Possibly of more importance are a research staff and facilities
large enough to make it unnecessary to divert research talent from
342PROMOTING STEADIER OUTPUT AND SALES
new-product or -process development to customer problems during
periods of high prosperity. If new research is sacrificed to current
sales development in boom times and commercial exploitation is
deferred in the face of weakening markets, research and develop-
ment are likely to have a procyclical impact.
Developing Supplementary Lines
The idea of developing supplementary product lines that either are
more or less depression-proof or have a different cycle was endorsed
more frequently by the respondents than any other single idea. The
concept and practice of product diversification and broadening
product lines are, of course, of long standing in American industry.
The emphasis on research works in this direction. The size of the
American market and the geographical spread of buyers over a wide
range of territory, with consequent heavy freight charges, similarly
encourage product broadening and diversification. For these reasons,
it is not surprising that American management has given much con-
sideration to gearing this diversification to mitigate market shifts,
including cyclical declines.
Joel Dean, an economist with extensive consultive experience,
states: "The practice of adding new products to mitigate cyclical
fluctuations and thereby mop up excess capacity is common enough.
Manufacturers of building materials, banking on the past inde-
pendence of building cycles and business cycles, have added indus-
trial products."2°
He cites the example of one firm that, to use the excess capacity
of felt mills in the early thirties, added a line of products for insulat-
ing and sound-proofing automobiles. The product proved successful,
even though it did not use the company's regular distribution chan-
nels and required a new sales force to sell directly to the automobile
manufacturers. The limited number of buyers helped in market
penetration.
There is considerable experience, as well as statistical evidence,
to show that new products and diversification provide some insur-
ance against a general market decline. The diesel locomotive was
launched in the depression of the 1930's and experienced substantial
growth so that, by the latter part of the depression, diesels outsold
steam locomotives by a substantial margin. Among its other advan-




Similarly, as shown in table 1, a number of consumer durable
goods resisted the depression in the 1930's remarkably well or ac-
tually expanded in volume. Radio receiver output declined much
more slowiy than most consumer durables and by the middle 1930's
production exceeded the 1929 levels by a wide margin. In the case
TABLE 1
DURABLE GooDs RESISTING DEPRESSION
LOCOMOTIVES, NUMBER OFELECTRIC APPLIANCES SOLD
NEW INSTALLATIONS Electric
Diesel Radio Household washing
Steam unitsa receivers refrigerators machines
1929 762 n.a. 4,428,000 630,000 956,000
1930 782 n.a. 3,827,800 791,000 802,000
1931 124 n.a. .8,420,000 906,000 812,000
1932 31 4 2,620,000 798,000 569,930
1933 1 2 3,806,000 1,016,000 966,698
1934 59 18 4,084,000 1,283,000 1,121,137
1935 36 15 5,500,016 1,568,000 1,228,774
1938 66 32 8,248,000 1,996,000 1,528,585
1937 362 74 8,065,000 2,310,000 1,485,405
1938 138 98 7,100,000 1,254,000 1,031,353
1939 76 205 10,538,000 1,900,000 1,329,377
1940 120 281 11,531,000 2,600,000 1,454,831
a Includesa small number of gas-electric and gasoline locomotives.
Sources: Locomotive data from Association of American Railroads, Railroad
Transportation, November 1950, P. 17. Electrical appliance data from Electrical
Merchandising, January 1935, pp. 9-11; January 1940, pp. 8-9; January 1948,
p. 40.
n.a.: Not available.
of household refrigerators, there was an actual expansion of sales
by nearly 50 per cent from 1929 to 1931. Electric washing machines
showed considerable resistance to contraction, and in 1933, sales
exceeded the level attained in 1929, after which substantial growth
took place. Diesels, radios, and refrigerators, of course, were in the
developmental stages. Enlarged or mass production itself made price
cuts practical and helped to penetrate the market.
These items are merely a few of the considerable range that
might be mentioned. They do indicate that expansion took place
in spite ofgeneral and precipitous contraction of the gross national
product and disposable income, and in the face of rising unemploy-
ment.21 This reemphasizes the importance of new-product develop-
21WesleyC. Mitchell's last work states: "According to our definition, the
basic feature of business cycles is substantial agreement among many economic
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ment and innovations, a matter discussed elsewhere.22 This experi-
ence might suggest that the more research-minded American indus-
try becomes, the greater are the prospects of putting a floor under
depression and stimulating recovery.
There are, of course, certain dangers in broadening the product
line and taking on new lines. The problem is frequently not one
of technical know-how or factory production but rather one of
marketing, sales organization, distribution outlets, and the gaining
of consumer acceptance.
An economist who has been associated with several companies
that have outstanding achievements of this kind to their credit
strongly endorses the idea of supplementary lines if they can be
made profitable, but states: "...whenmen enter lines of business
which they do not understand, where their problems are quite
different from those to which they are accustomed, the results often
are a waste of raw materials, management effort, labor, and capital.
I do not mean to imply that changing the structure of a business
is an unreasonable practice—I merely wish to indicate that I do not
think there are many businesses which can be so changed in a
structural sense with the major object being that of improving the
stability of sales."
An executive of a chemical company that has made specific efforts
to develop supplementary lines says: "...thisapproach appears
particularly fruitful in our business, which caters to every other
industry there is. We are engaged at present, in my division, in a
study of how our various products have behaved during previous
depressions or recessions. We are also studying the industries we
serve to see which ones have proven most depression-proof and, as
a matter of policy, we try to steer our research and development
work principally in such direction. There is a high mortality on our
products, and in a typical good year about 45 per cent of our sales
and profits will come from products which have been developed
within the past ten years."
activities in the timing of their expansions and of their contractions. Yet less
than half of the average patterns of the series in our sample characteristically
reach their lowest points at reference troughs and their highest pointsat
reference peaks. Our efforts to observe and to understand what happens during
business cycles begin with the differences found in this fundamental trait."
What Happens during Business Cycles, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1951, p. 51. Also of interest is the National Bureau's Cyclical Diversities in the
Fortunes of Industrial Corporations, by Thor Hultgren, 1950.
22 pp.299-816, above.
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The president of a rubber products company refers to several
successful experiences in these words: "Depression-proof lines can
be very helpful....Recognitionof the difference in timing by
product is useful. For example, in our company the impact of a
change in the business cycle falls at a different point for several of
our key products. However ...thesuccess of one company in this
direction merely takes business from another, without significant
change in national sales or employment."
The vice-president of another rubber company states:"...the
development of supplementary lines which are contracyclical or
show less reaction to swings in the business cycle...isa very fruit-
ful area for management study. A number of companies with whom
I am acquainted have done some worthwhile work in this field and
it has paid dividends for them in enabling them to balance produc-
tion and inventory, and in maintaining a stable working force."
The economist of still another rubber products company states:
"It is amazing how few concerns in lines which are very vulnerable
to fluctuations in the business cycle have taken steps to develop less
vulnerable lines. It is also amazing how few concerns have attempted
to develop products which have a different cycle of fluctuation from
those which they already have.
the rubber companies were trying to get into fields which
would be less chronically depressed and less sporadically aggra-
vated. This example is not one of conscious effort at developing
products that will be proof against general economic depression.
However, the items which the rubber industry has taken on—
plastics, steel products, general merchandise, batteries, spark plugs,
aircraft, footwear, wheels, brakes, etc.—have in fact all tended to
have different cycles of fluctuation under adverse economic con-
ditions.
A building supply manufacturer, formerly subject to extreme
seasonal and cyclical fluctuations, has sought, with considerable suc-
cess, to broaden the use of its main raw materials. The impact of
the instability was disastrous to both the company and the com-
munity. As a result of its planned program the company now
produces 85 per cent nondurable consumer goods, 80 per cent con-
sumer durables, and about 85 per cent capital goods. This company
added a glass container and closure business primarily because of
its resistance to depression.
An executive of a company manufacturing producers' equipment,
whose sales of its chief product tend to approach zero in a major
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depression, reports a comprehensive long-range plan designed to
make the enterprise less vulnerable in depression. His comment is
worth quoting at some length: "Some 20 years ago the company
decided that its future existence was pretty much contingent on
diversification. The problem was to take a plant which was set up
for large and heavy metal working projects and fill it with other
type products. You can understand that this was and still is a metal
working plant and it would be absurd for it to consider the manu-
facture of small consumers' goods or even soft goods. Thus, again,
the question of how to go about accomplishing this diversification
arose. The management considered starting from scratch to develop
products but that was rejected because it was the long and difficult
way of doing it. So the decision was made to acquire a company
which manufactured heavy capital goods but which had some
promise of not being subject to the same violent economic swings
as in the case of the original product. This diversification has proved
satisfactory over the years since we now enjoy very satisfactory and
profitable business in materials testing equipment, hydraulic tur-
bines, and hydraulic presses.
"However, in recent years it has been realized that even these
newer products are not completely depression-proof (what is?) and,
as you have probably read in the newspapers, within the last year
we have acquired a company which manufactures road building
equipment and another which manufactures earth moving and con-
struction equipment, such as cranes, hoists, and draglines, etc. We
believe the road building equipment, and the cranes, hoists, and
dragline items should be about as good as any in... maintaining
the profitability of our company in poor times. Generally speaking,
they will feed into projects which may be° supported by the pump
priming techniques in the period of serious economic recession.
"We have not exhausted as yet our search for other products
which will...addto our diversification but, of course, financial
problems make it improbable that we can go at any great speed.
We. have some developments going forward but these necessarily
must be on a very modest basis. ... acquiringcompanies which can
frequently be accomplished by the trading of common stock seems
to be the quickest and easiest way of establishing one's self in the
market place—and we are going more and more in that direction
eveiy day."
The president of a machinery company, with a long record of
contracyclical research and planning, makes the following state-
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ment: "Although we stay in lines of manufacture that require
precision machining, we have diversified our customers and products
to the extent that we serve many industries. Thus, in any given
period, if one type of industry is depressed, we are able to turn our
facilities over to another industry which may be operating more
satisfactorily. We have also concentrated our past research efforts to
development work in diversified fields."
The purchasing agent of an arms-producing company states:
"Development of supplementary depression-proof lines is advisable,
if only from the standpoint of diversification. My own company has
recently made a heavy investment in a product in extremely wide
demand and which for years has been underproduced. It is entirely
foreign to our basic manufacturing processes and sales field. It looks
very promising. With good management it should be an excellent
hedge when our other products fall off. Some of these other products
are in a category of declining demand for a number of years."
Investment counsels and consultants, in their professional advisory
activities, pay considerable attention to this matter of diversification
and the possible impact of depression. One such counsel makes the
following comment:
"There have been many examples over a period of years of com-
panies which have diversified their business with varying degrees
of success in hopes of obtaining greater stability. One cannot make a
case, however, that very many of these companies specifically
attempted to wipe out the cycle in its normal economic concept.
Rather, there appears to have been an effort to 'broaden the base'
so that one group of products may be doing well while another is
lagging. This variation in performance may coincide with the normal
business cycle, but not n'ecessarily so.
"One aspect of cycle protection that must be considered is that
of partial integration. There have been many examples in the past,
but I would like to point out a recent one....textile mill] has
become fully integrated through the converting stage. It has, how-
ever, sufficient finishing capacity to supply only possibly 60 per cent
of its needs. In a period of declining volume it would expect first
to cut off the custom finishers which it had been using to handle
the remaining 40 per cent, continuing activities in its own finishing
plants at a maximum level as long as possible. Obviously, to the
extent that this can be done, costs are reduced and organizations
are maintained—at the expense of others. ...[Thiscompany] also
believes it can reduce its cyclical variations through its integration
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to the consumer level. In a period of poor business its people can
actively fight for retail or clothing manufacturing business. Formerly
when it was selling to converters, it could not reach the consumer
and its only avenue to promote sales was to cut p.rices in competi-
tion with other mills.
"Another example is that of...[amanufacturer] of dairy
machinery. Its business of course is quite cyclical. It has developed,
however, a so-called jobbing business which has made up approxi-
mately 40 per cent of the sales in the last several years. This line
includes milk bottles, caps and various other routine supply items.
This jobbing line has been very beneficial. It carries a low profit
margin but, nevertheless, has been helpful as it provides income
for salesmen and helps to cover overhead and keep the organiza-
tion together in poor periods. Furthermore, it enables the salesmen
in the normal course of their jobbing calls to visit the dairies which
are the markets for the company's major products. Thus, even in
periods of poor business the salesmen can economically survey
customers' machinery needs and attempt to promote machinery sales
even though the possibility of a machinery sale alone would not
justify a call on the dairy."
A food machinery company merged with a chemical company,
partly to reduce cyclical vulnerability. The food machinery com-
pany's business was highly cyclical because it supplied capital goods
to a somewhat cyclical branch of the food business. The chemical
company supplied chemicals to consumer goods industries but also
had a strong growth trend that tended to mitigate the cycle. The
combination of the two companies makes operations considerably
less vulnerable. The president of the company further states:
"In addition, we have developed over the past twenty years a
substantial volume of leased machinery income which is based on
the number of units going over a machine rather than...on
whether the customer is in position to buy equipment or not, and
this we feel adds some stabilizing effect to our volume..
"Afew years ago we also endeavored to expand our operating
base so that we would have a reasonable distribution in our volume
between the sale of equipment which can be replaced only when it
is worn out or when it is rendered obsolete, and the sale of con-
sumable products, which are used up by the customer who pur-
chases them.
"We have expanded substantially in the chemical field, and as of
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December 31, 1950, our volume was 51 per cent in consumable
products, and 49 per cent in the sale of machinery.
"Our machinery volume is divided between sales to farmers, fresh
fruit and vegetable packers and canners and industrial users. Our
chemical sales are divided between sales to farmers, industrial users
and other chemical companies."
Another investment counsel makes the following points:
The aircraft companies were acutely aware of the problem
in World War II, and fairly widespread attempts were made to add
new lines. I believe one of the companies that made floats for hydro-
planes was until recently turning out canoes, which they were well
suited to produce. I would suggest that the whole record of this
industry be examined, ...forpurposes of ascertaining what extra-
neous lines survived, and the reasons why others were discontinued.
My impression is that one of the companies recently abandoning its
nonaircraft line regarded its experience as a success, and is ready to
pick it up again in case a similar situation had to be met.
"My years... werespent in the development division, which
gave consideration to these and other marketing problems. A great
many ideas were filtered through the division, which was staffed
with engineers, marketing men and technicians. Many inventions
were considered, and some of the older engineering devices were
examined for use at present. The effort ended with the purchase of
two auxiliary lines of manufacture, the discarding of certain inven-
tions as nonworkable, and the development of one aircraft accessory
which could have only a narrow market. Unexpectedly the problem
of business organization appeared important, as well as the engineer-
ing and marketing considerations involved. The record for the in-
dustry as a whole ought to show the difficulties involved and prob-
ably a number of examples of what not to do.
"A more optimistic showing might be found among the industries
that lived through the depression of the 1930's and found themselves
with an entirely changed list of products when business again be-
came active....[Thepresident of a company experiencing serious
trouble in the 1930's] said that over 50 per cent of the items manu-
factured after the depression were not made before, and he did not
believe that survival would have been possible without these
changes.
An executive of a food-processing plant states: "Success and
growth through depression and prosperity is in part the result of
our efforts to diversify, first in the food field and later in other lines.
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I do not know what would happen if we had another severe depres-
sion, but I do know that our diversified lines have had sustained
earnings during the recent depressed conditions in the flour busi-
ness.
In a few instances, respondents questioned the effectiveness of
this trend in terms of the economy as a whole. For example, a bank
economist said: "I suppose some people would stress developing
depression-proof products, etc., but there is no stabilizing effect on
the economy as a whole in such stability of the individual firm. If
everybody tries to develop depression-proof products, I am afraid
that there won't be many that are in fact depression-proof."
However, this type of comment was not typical. Business execu-
tives are heavily motivated in their diversification efforts by the
impact of their instability on their own community, their personnel,
and, in general, their "organization." Depression causes the loss of
key men, the loss of momentum, the loss of morale, and the disinte-
gration of sales forces and contact with individuals in the market.
For all these reasons, many business executives would undoubtedly
favor diversification, even though it could be proven that this move-
ment has no net effect on total employment and production through-
out the economy.
It is doubtful if this could be proven, although the converse may
be equally difficult to prove. It does appear at least as a possibility
that if more and more companies develop policies that prevent com-
plete collapse and help maintain income, the cumulative contractive
process of a depression may be steadied or halted. The spending
and investing activities may be better maintained, even though, as
some of the respondents point out, certain types of company policies
may merely "export" unemployment to other companies.
Contracyclical Sales and Advertising Effort
The idea that we can advertise ourselves out of depression keeps
recurring. The increasing emphasis, in economic analysis, on expec-
tation as an important factor in governing the level of economic
activity may suggest that the idea is not wholly wishful thinking.23
Research indicates that advertising outlays as a whole have prob-
ably accentuated cyclical fluctuations, even though there are many
individual exceptions.24 Table 2 shows that in general, advertising
28GeorgeKatona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior, McGraw-
Hill, 1951; Hart, op.cit.
24SeeS. M. Ramdell, "How Philco Doubled Sales during the Depression,"
Printers' Ink, October 22, 1931.
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TABLE 2















1919 T 92.1 88.2 94.5 na. n.a. n.a.
1920 P 106.8 104.2 107.5 na. n.a. n.a.
1921 T 91.3 68.4 98.2 na. n.a. n.a.
1922 97.2 77.8 102.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1923 P 106.9 95.0 109.4 n.a. n.a. na.
1924 T 107.0 97.1 109.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1925 112.0 98,8 113.6 125.8 n.a. n.a.
1926 P 118.0 110.8 118.3 129.1 n.a. ri.a.
1927 T 115.8 112.6 114.5 133.5 n.a. n.a.
1928 114.7 113.8 112.5 184.7 n.a. n.a.
1929 P 120.7 125.4 118.9 124.8 n.a. n.a.
1930 104.9 109.2 103.7 105.6 n.a. n.a.
1931 91.9 88.2 92.0 79.1 n.a. n.a.
1932 T 71.8 63.5 72.9 55.8 n.a. n.a.
1983 65.0 58.9 66.7 47.7 n.a. n.a.
1934 74.7 76.0 73.8 51.7 n.a. n.a.
(1935-1939 average =100)
1935 83 71 95 78 69 82
1936 99 95 107 96 89 97
1937 P 110 114 108 110 107 112
1938 T 101 101 94 107 112 97
1989 107 108 96 109 123 111
1940 118 119 102 112 144 122
1941 127 128 103 124 162 143
1942 121 125 90 103 179 158
1943 152 163 114 99 213 229
1944 P 180 193 123 131 265 284
1945 198 217 132 188 289 328
1946 T 230 271 155 202 299 340
1947 268 315 210 264 296 374
1948 P 290 327 246 299 309 394
1949 T 299 314 284 296 292 389
1950 337 330 318 322 284 392
Sources:1919-1934 data from Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Busi-
ness,0 1942Supplement, p. 29. Business cyde peak and troughdates from
NationalBureau of Economic Research. 1935-50 data fromPrinters' Ink, June
1,1951, pp. 61-64.
n.a.:Not available.
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outlays have fluctuated closely in accord with the general level of
economic activity. Paul C. Hoffman, former president of the Stude-
baker Corporation and chairman of the Committee for Economic
Development, stated: "We American businessmen have a strange
sales habit. We cut our advertising and other sales expenditures
when business is tough to get and we need it. Then we let those
expenditures float skyhigh when business is easy to get and we have
even too much of it. This is the exact reverse of sense."
The view that advertising may actually have accentuated eco-
nomic fluctuations is indicated in a study by Louis ç.Wagner.25He
analyzed advertising outlays for the cycles in the 1920's and 1980's
and found that the recovery of advertising expenditures lagged
behind recovery of physical production, as measured by the Federal
Reserve index, in each of four recovery periods. The downturn in
advertising outlays lagged somewhat behind business downturns.
The same general picture occurred when advertising outlays were
correlated with factory employment and total national income
payments.
No doubt these lags are explained in part by the method of
handling advertising budgets and appropriations. There is likely to
be a lag of weeks and months between budgeting, appropriating the
funds, and deciding to proceed and the actual appearance of
advertising copy in print (except in cases like that of retail adver-
tising in newspapers).
A possible reason for the cyclical behavior of advertising is the
lack of accurate knowledge on the part of the business executive as
to the precise power of advertising. In some cases, such as depart-
ment store displays in the local newspaper, the degree of consumer
response to advertising outlays and different types of copy is
measurable. Much of the advertising designed to stimulate longer-
run consumer good will, consumer confidence, and consumer re-
sponse does not result in clearly measurable sales changes. For this
reason amodest,or perhaps even major, cut in advertising outlays
may not be regarded as of serious immediate concern. In some cases,
especially in the field of durable producer goods, the demand for
the commodity may completely disappear during slack times and
the manufacturer concludes that advertising could have no per-
ceptible effect.
Another possible reason for the cyclical volatility of advertising
25"Advertisingand the Business Cycle," Journal of Marketing, October 1941,
p. 124.
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outlays is traceable to the fact that when contraction takes place
and expenses must be cut, it is easier to do the cutting in remote
places, where the resistance to cuts is least and away from where the
executives live and work—the advertising agency and the media in
which the agency places the ads. This suggests that the faith of the
business executive in the power of advertising is not full and abiding.
In terms of marginal analysis, advertising outlays should be
expanded to the point where the last advertising dollar brings in an
additional dollar above production costs. But this test requires
ability to measure results.26
How are advertising budgets determined and appropriations made
by business management?
It would appear that for most companies the number of dollars
invested in advertising is determined by no formal rule or proce-
dure. Much trial and error and experience over the years may suggest
that a certain fraction of the expected sales dollar be allocated to
advertising. Some such approach appears to be very general. This
might be called the pro cycle or built-in-cycle policy of determining
advertising budgets. When sales expand or are expected to expand,
this trend is reinforced by more advertising. When sales shrink or
are expected to shrink, the cut in advertising outlays will feed the
shrinkage. Roland S. Vaile recognizes on-peak advertising as a
source of trouble and correctly attributes at least a part of the over-
stimulation of demand toward the peak to an elastic money and
credit system.27
Much advertising is geared to a new product, product improve-
ment, or new packaging. Since these innovations tend to conform
closely to the cycle, this method of determining the advertising
outlay likewise accentuates the cycle.
It appears also that profitability of the product, or of company
operations as a whole, is an important factor in governing the volume
of advertising. If funds are available or appear to be in prospect,
a certain proportion is allocated to advertising.
In many cases the competitive position of the company or product
may govern the size of the advertising outlay. This intercompany
competition likewise feeds the cycle.
Some advertising, of course, is directed not at creating immediate
20JoelDean, "Cyclical Policy on the Advertising Appropriation," Journal of
Marketing, January 1951, P. 265, attempts to set forth criteria and standards
for measuring the usefulness of contracyclical advertising and for helping
management to take out some of the guesswork.
27InJournal of Marketing, July 1951, p. 81, note.
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sales but at establishing the company's name or the name of the
product and developing long-term good will and favorable consumer
reaction. This mode of allocating advertising on a sustained basis
may help mitigate cyclical fluctuations.
In short, most of the methods of determining advertising outlays
seem to rest on more or less chance factors. Considerable research
and analysis have gone into determining the effects of advertising.
The number of variables influencing consumer acceptance and
response is large and is constantly changing.
Some experience indicates that advertising can be used to offset
cyclical declines, but apparently it has not been sufficiently convinc-
ing to make advertising a substantial contracyclical weapon.28 More
research of like companies producing for like markets in which the
only variable is the amount of advertising is needed.
The corporate income tax tends to favor concentration of adver-
tising during prosperity (advertising outlays being deductible) and
penalizes attempts to accumulate advertising reserves to be spent in
depression. Proposals have been made on numerous occasions for
the creation of "deferrable advertising funds" that would be tax-
free.2°
0. A. Keyser, basing his conclusion on the cumulative effect of
depression anticipations, urges that long-range budgeting for adver-
tising should provide sustained outlays, recognizing that this prob-
ably would involve special legislation to permit the accumulation of
reserve funds.8°
The progressive corporate income tax, e.g., the wartime excess
profits tax, puts a special premium upon advertising outlays during
wartime When downward revisions of corporate income
tax rates can be anticipated, as after a war period, such taxes tend
to be procyclical. Timing advertising to minimize corporate income
taxes tends to encourage cyclical fluctuations in advertising outlays.
Whether advertising can have a stabilizing influence on the gen-
eral level of economic activity, and therefore on investment, depends
on a number of factors, including the degree to which it can change
expectations and overcome spending timidity as well as the rapidity
28RolandS. Vaile, "The Use of Advertising During Depression," Harvard
Business Review, vol. 5, 1927, p. 323.
29Adverti$ingAge, April 16 and 30, 1951.
80See"A Countercyclical Fund for Advertising," Advertising and Selling,
April 1947, P. 34.
81BeardsleyRumi, "Abolish Corporate Taxes," Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, July 5, 1951.
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with which it can induce such shifts. The economist of a group of
textile industries concludes that "At best such advertising outlays
might aid in bringing about an earlier revival of demand."
The president ofa farm-implement-manufacturing company,
while skeptical of the efficacy of depression advertising in his field,
did say: "One thing that we did do during that period that did
produce some volume for us and did have an effect was the liberal-
ization of terms on which the goods were sold. In other words, we
financed the retail business by accepting the farmers' notes for
direct credit and there were farmers that bought equipment because
of that who would not have bought otherwise. There was no bank
that would loan them money and they simply did not have the
resources to pay cash."
There are enough individual cases where a well-adapted and well-
timed advertising program has put individual companies ahead of
their competitors in recovery to suggest that here is an area in which
considerable additional research might well be undertaken. Some
system of incentives may have to be found to reduce on-peak ad-
vertising outlays.
The economist of a rubber products company believes that a
change of attitude is taking place and that business executives are
educable on this matter:
"A few years ago it was commonplace to see market research
departments severely curtailed in number of personnel and in
expenditures during periods of slow sales. This tendency is fortu-
nately changing for the better. The same thing is true regarding the
number of salesmen. At one time manufacturing concerns used to
lay off salesmen when times got bad; they do so less frequently now.
It is in the field of advertising that the old and unwise tendency to
reduce expenditures in the face of needs for increase seems to have
held ground... mostfirmly. Advertising expenditures still lag very
sharply when sales fall off.
"In this particular it is my own belief that the wisest course is
to maintain a more-or-less regular and steady absolute volume of
advertising, selling and market research expenditures during good
times and bad....
"But this is clearly a question on which businessmen are suscep-
tible to education at the hands of their advisors in the trade associa-
tion field, their marketing consultants and the writers in the business
press. Incidentally, there is little uniformity of thinking among such
groups as to which is the best course. ..
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Contracyclical advertising standing alone would be a weak reed
to rest upon. If it is coupled with other countermeasures, as, for
example, in the penultimate quotation above, it may have some in-
fluence. This is a matter that may merit further systematic research.
Debt during Expansion and Depression
Business booms are financed to a considerable degree by expansion
of debt. During periods of contraction debt is repaid. Most of the
respondents to this inquiry conclude that this sequence should and
could be substantially altered, thereby either mitigating depression
or making the firm and the economy less vulnerable in a depression.82
Corporate debt expanded rapidly during the 1920's. From 1929 to
1935 nonrailway net corporate debt declined from $73.9 billion to
$59.6 billion. In this period, net long-term debt declined more
moderately, from $33.8 billion to $30 billion, while short-term debt
dropped from $40.1 to $29.6 In the recession of 1949 there
was also a minor decline in debt. While fluctuations in capital forma-
tion are viewed as the heart of the cycle, the rise and fall of debt
play important facilitating roles.
Debt expansion is usually accompanied by an expansion of the
money supply, and debt repayment by its contraction. To the degree
to which this is the case, the cyclical character of our economy is
deepened. The effects of slowdown in collections, insolvencies, dif-
ficulties in debt servicing and refundings—of a systemic "linkage
of risks"—may spread throughout the economy when the general
level of economic activity declines. The corporation income tax law
places a high premium on financing growth through debt creation.
"Trading on the equity" and artificially low interest rates work in
the same direction.
Is it possible and desirable to finance business expansion to a
greater degree without debt creation? The importance of the prompt
investment of the community's current savings, of course, is fully
recognized. Isit possible for savings institutions and financial
organizations to take any practical steps to reduce the volume and in-
crease the cost of financing toward the peak of the boom, and raise
the volume and decrease the cost during periods of contraction?
The economist of an insurance company was inclined to question
the contracyclical power of the nonfinancial individual enterprise
32Editor'snote: For another view of the function of debt in relation to the
cycle, see the paper by Jacoby and Weston, below.
88Dept.of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, October 1950,p. 9.
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but is convinced that private financial institutions have an important
contribution to make in terms of loan policy, financial instruments,
and the like, a challenge to which they have not fully risen. He put
his views in these words: "...the financial organizations are actually
more important factors in cyclical fluctuations—or more accurately,
the causes of cyclical fluctuations—than the nonfinancial....For
these financial organizations there is, I feel, a very clear line of
action which would at least help to mitigate cyclical fluctuation and
is at the same time consistent with profit maximization. This is to
act more determinedly in applying the knowledge which has now
been developed about their relation to cyclical fluctuation."
Then he gave one reason for this view: "A number of studies of
different groups of loan and investment items all show quite clearly
that losses and costs are largest on loans and investments made in
the boom, and that losses and costs are least on loans and invest-
ments made during the lower phases of the cycle; in addition, yield
is usually higher during the depressed phase. Financial institutions,
it appears, can therefore improve their results by acting in a contra-
cyclical manner. And I believe that if they did so their force on the
economy would be found to be sufficiently large tO make a major
contribution against the cycle. I suspect that this influence would be
greater than anything the nonfinancial institutions can reasonably be
expected to do if they stay in character."
In reply to a request for his views as to how these institutions
could be induced to operate contracyclically, this economist said:
A lot of information has been developed, especially at the
National Bureau of Economic Research and the financial concerns
have contributed considerable sums to the research. The informa-
tion has not yet all been published and so there will be further im-
pact from additional publications. It is encouraging that discussions
of the information occur at significant places like the Graduate
School of Banking of the American Bankers Association and the
Life Officers Investment Seminar of the American Life Convention.
"But I regretfully expect that it will receive the greatest attention
and consideration the next time we have a considerable slump and
investment mortality and morbidity. The depression of the 1930's
largely stimulated the development of the information. The next
slump may bring it into general use.
These are challenging ideas and they appear to merit considerably
more attention than they have received. It appears that American
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business is becoming more and more skeptical about the wisdom
of incurring debt.
Net corporate debt (exclusive of railways) stood at $78.9 billion
in 1929. By 1949, the figure had risen to $99 billion. In this same
period, long-term debt grew from $83.8 billion to only $44.3 billion,
while short-term debt increased from $40 billion to $55 billion, in
spite of the relative expansion of the corporate sector of the econ-
omy, the substantial real growth of economic activity, and the
depreciation in the value of the dollar.
This would suggest that American business has been developing
what may be a desirable resistance to debt. It is sometimes sug-
gested that corporations now do not need to go into debt because
of the rise in corporate liquidity. Liquid assets of corporations (ex-
cluding public utilities, railroads, corporations engaged in finance
and insurance, etc.) rose from $21.4 billion 1929 to $44 billion in
1947, a rise of 106 per cent, but sales and receipts from operations
rose from $124 billion to $317 billion, or by 155 per cent, in the same
period. From 1929 to 1949 the gross national product increased, in
dollars, by 148 per cent. The rise in corporate debt since 1929 has
lagged behind the rise in these figures.
Respondents in this inquiry, very generally, either advised against
debt incursion during boom times or stated that company policy was
committed to that in principle, or that the principle was followed
closely. The economist of a building supply manufacturer stated
that his company's policy was to reserve debt increase for depression
periods only.
The economist of a fat and oil products manufacturer stated: "We
experience major fluctuations in production and trade, and conse-
quently in employment, chiefly because of the way in which we use
our credit system. We permit persons buying for consumption
purposes to seriously misuse credit. ... Wealso permit the managers
of enterprise to do the same thing...[creditshould not] be used to
finance the purchase of any commodity which is not to be sold to
obtain funds with which to retire the credit extended—mortgages
alone might he excepted... BecauseI place so much importance
on the use of credit, I think it would be beneficial if the managers
of enterprise would be more cautious when borrowing money to
expand capacity. It is obvious that managers miscalculate their
financial budgets with the result that they invest working capital in
fixed assets and are required to borrow money with which to replace
the immobilized working capital when a cyclical high level in busi-
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ness activity is being experienced....[The]important objective
in the interest of stabilization would be to develop a credit system
which could not be so easily misused."
The general manager of a farm-implement-manufacturing con-
cern, which has been making a special study of contracyclical capital
formation, has given this matter such careful consideration that he
merits quotation at some length:
"One of the greatest opportunities, in my opinion, for [business
to make] a real contribution to the over-all recovery during a period
of this kind...hasto do with planned expansion and capital
investment.
most of it is done during a period of high business activity
when building costs are very high, material and labor prices are
way up and looking back over the long period of years ... most
companies would have not only been very much further ahead if
they had expanded their plant facilities during those periods which
would have given a lot of stimulus to the over-all recovery but such
expansion would have cost them a lot less money than doing it when
everybody else was wanting to do it and when productivity was at a
peak.
"If we would have had the foresight during the depression years
to have made some long-term loans and completed even a moderate
portion of the expansion that has taken place in our company since
1935 we would have benefited tremendously. ... Wewould have
had a much larger share of the market on many items on which our
design is such that they are in great demand, far in excess of what
we could supply. We would have had, in my opinion, enough in-
creased volume and profits to have paid for the expansion several
times over and the amount of investment would have been a great
deal less because we would not have paid the high labor and mate-
rial costs which we have paid and which have been growing pro-
gressively higher since that time. Our own company doubled the
amount invested in buildings and equipment since 1941 so you can
see what a material advantage it would have been. I think that our
history has been duplicated by practically every other industry in
the country.
"It might be necessary to work out some long-range financing on
a favorable basis, but it would be much better if private industry
could provide that sort of activity rather than rely on public works
during periods of depression. It takes a considerable amount of
selling to get boards of directors to appropriate moneys for expansion
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at a time when present facilities [are] more than adequate to take
care of the demand, but the fact ...remainsthat, over the past
50 years in this country, had industry expanded during these periods,
it would have had a major effect in leveling the business cycle and
eliminating some of these extreme fluctuations."
The president of a large chemical-manufacturing concern that
has experienced spectacular growth states: "We favor equity financ-
ing fin contrast to obtaining some portion of corporate capital by
debt financing] for many reasons, perhaps the most important of
which is the feeling that equity financing would strengthen our
ability to weather business fluctuations whatever their cause might
The president of a company manufacturing paper and paper
products that has also been giving exceptional attention to anti-
cyclical policies discusses debt in• these terms: "It seems axiomatic
that the strength of the enterprise—its ability to exist—will be
strengthened if in periods of high business it uses a substantial
amount of its earnings to retire its debt so that when and if there is
a downturn its fixed charges will be minimized. Furthermore I
assume as a matter of pure theory that short-term rather than long-
term debt is preferable if the management is certain of its ability
to repay the debt during the shorter term, again leaving it with a
minimum of fixed charges...."
Thepresident of a rubber products company that has also taken
numerous steps to reduce the cyclical impact puts the matter in
these words: "It is obvious that the company with ample cash and
a financial structure based on equity securities has the most sound
position at the top of the cycle. From a financial viewpoint, a com-
pany should be prepared to expand when things look the worst, and
be prepared to contract when things look the best...."
Theinability to expand capital investment during depression
periods is recognized by many respondents as a serious hindrance
to a contracyclical investment policy. An economist who is asso-
ciated with numerous business institutions and companies and who
has served as a consultant over a good many years puts the matter
in these words:
"There are obvious advantages in being in a position to minimize
expense cuts and to make capital expenditures and other unusual
expenditures of various kinds at the bottom of the market, with
important benefits to both the corporation and the general economy.
Such expenditures are not likely to be made in the depression phase
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of the business cycle unless there are surplus funds on hand, par-
ticularly if there is corporate debt outstanding. Certainly an im-
portant part of the impetus toward recovery from depression is the
resumption of investment in one form or another by companies and
individuals who still have available cash.
I should think the greatest deterrent to countercyclical
expenditures in time of depression would be the presence of debt in
the capital structure. Of course, the following of these policies is
more easily said than done, but it seems to me the subject of cash
balances in industry has been a much neglected
The chairman of the board of a food-processing plant states the
company policy as follows: "In most businesses the capital obtained
from the sale of common and preferred stock• should be sufficient to
cover the fixed investments in brick and mortar and equipment,
together with working capital for average inventories and receiv-
ables. Then commercial credit can be used freely to take care of
seasonal peaks and short-term requirements."
An economist for another food company states his company's
policy as follows: "This is a question which is easy to answer in
theory, difficult to apply in practice. In theory, one should contract
debts and short-term loans in a depression and should pay them
off with equity capital in prosperity. However, as a practical matter,
it has been very difficult to raise large amounts of equity capital
since the war on anything like a reasonable basis in comparison with
the cost of debt or preferred stock money. However, our firm has
attempted to use as little short-term financing as possible during the
postwar period so that we will be in a position to use this type of
financing if we can find a profitable use for it in a period of depres-
sion.
In a study of business executive motivations in buying equipment
the question was asked:. "To what extent is the customer's current
liquid position a factor in his decision to buy or not to buy your
product?" Eighty-two per cent of the replies stated that the liquid
position was "determining or important.""
Insolvencies, bankruptcies, defaults, and refunding problems on. a
large scale, as in the 1930's in the case of railways, hotels, real estate
companies, etc., create spending timidity and slow down forward
The National Bureau of Economic Research has been concerned with this
problem in some of its studies, particularly in the Financial Research Program
and the Studies in Business Financing. The study by Friedrich A. Lutz, Corpo-
rate Cash Balances, 1914-43, NBER, 1945, is of particular relevance. "GeorgeTerborgh, Dynamic Equipment Policy, McGraw-Hill, 1949, p. 229.
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planning until "the picture clears."36 In this period one large life
insurance company found itself the owner of 188 hotels.
Assuming that the shift away from debt financing during boom
periods continues, it would appear that when markets softened and
demand receded, many companies would find themselves in a less
vulnerable position. If this in turn placed these companies in a better
position to finance improvements and extensions by borrowing dur-
ing periods when the economic outlook is less favorable, capital
formation might not decline so precipitously or so much. If in addi-
tion such a shift in financing did not retard the prompt offsetting
of savings, it would seem to be a move in the right direction.
Employment Stabilization and the Guaranteed Wage
The regularization of employment and greater continuity of wage
payments are widespread management objectives. Much has been
accomplished with respect particularly to seasonal and other short-
run instability of production or sales, or both, as previously pointed
out. In a few cases, guaranteed annual wage plans have been worked
out and adopted. Would a more widespread adoption of such plans
be beneficial to the individual company and its employees? Would
it make the economy, as a whole, more stable? As to the former, the
answer given is frequently in the affirmative with the qualification
"wherever practical." As to the latter, most students have answered
in the negative.
Alvin H. Hansen and Paul A. Samuelson, in a report for the
United States government, drew these conclusions:
"From a dispassionate appraisal of the efficacy of guaranteed
wages, the device would appear to be, by itself alone, a weak reed
upon which to rely in an attack on such widespread unemployment
as our economy has encountered in recent years. Indeed it would be
nothing less than tragic if, by management initiative or govern-
mental and trade-union pressure, an ambitious program of guaran-
teed wages was undertaken without at the same time instituting
other more important programs of government and business de-
signed to promote high and stable levels of production, income and
employment.
"If other governmental measures were not instituted to cope with
depressions, sober quantitative appraisal of the relationship of pay
36"By1932, 81 per cent of the nation's hotels were in the hands of the
courts, receivers, trustees and lending institutions." American Hotel Association,
op.cit.
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rolls to corporate net worth shows that insolvency and bankruptcy
could well be the price of any guaranteed wage program which was
not carefully limited in its coverage and duration.
"Unless a general, many-sided attack is made upon the problem
of business cycle stabilization, together with a step-by-step industry-
wide attack upon seasonal instability of production, guaranteed
wage plans are likely to be so costly as to be doomed to failure."37
This view is generally shared by other economists.38 Some of them
take the view that if a company tends to be stable cyclically or has
worked out a regularization program, there is no harm and possibly
some good in formalizing a guarantee of employment.
The business executives who have adopted the guaranteed wage,
almost without exception, stress that their guaranteed wage program
is a result of prior regularization policies and programs. For this
reason, Jay C. Hormel, chairman of the board of the George A.
Hormel Company, Austin, Minn., states that he now regrets that
his stabilization program has become identified with the phrases
"annual wages," "guaranteed wages," and the like. Richard II.
Deupree, president of the Procter and Gamble Company, another
leader in the field, has viewed the guarantee as a result of long-range
management policies to regularize production and sales. The guar-
antee is inôidental, especially since most companies reserve the right
to terminate it.
Important for this paper, however, is the basic question as to
whether such company guarantee programs are beneficial or harm-
ful to the economy as a whole. At least one attempt has been made
to study the impact of a company stabilization program upon the
community.89 This study by Chernick attempted to determine the
impact of the Hormel plan (put into operation during the depressed
1930's) on spending habits of the employees of the company and
on others in the community, and its effect on capital formation.
Austin is a "one-industry" town. By an ingenious method, Chernick
compared changes in the community with changes in similar com-
munities and larger regions. Unfortunately for. the conclusiveness of
Guaranteed Wages, report to the President by the Advisoxy Board, Office
of War Mobilization and Reconversion, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1947, p. 417.
A. D. H. Kaplan, The Guarantee of Wages, chap. 7. Several other econ-
omists have come to similar negative conclusions. See particularly Rita Ricardo,
"Annual Wage Guaranteed Plans," American Economic RevIew, December
1945, p. 870; Wassily Leontief, "The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed Annual
Wage Contract," Journal of Political Economy, February 1946, p. 76.
89 Jack Chernick, Economic Effects of Steady Employment and Earnings,
University of Minnesota Press, 1942.
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his studies, the Hormel Company experienced substantial growth
during the period in question so that it was not possible to isolate
completely the effects of this growth and the effects of the stabiliza-
tion program.
Chernick's cautious conclusions on the effects of the program and
policies merit quotation at some length:
"....They increased the velocity of circulation of money and, in a
sense, the volume of purchasing power. ...TheHormel employee
was in a position to estimate his future earnings and to plan his
expenditures in such a way as to permit him to buy a variety of
durable consumers' goods without first accumulating the sum which
those goods would require if purchased for cash. The local merchant,
recognizing that the earnings of the Hormel employee were guar-
anteed for at least a year, displayed greater readiness to sell durable
consumers' goods on an installment basis. The agencies in the city
that make loans to individuals for buying or building a home also
considered the Hormel employee a good credit risk after the intro-
duction of the annual wage.
"The effect of Hormel policies on the consumption habits of com-
pany employees is evident in the fact that the proportion of pur-
chases made on an installment basis was greater among Hormel
employees than in the rest of the state and in various other centers
in the United States. It may also be seen in the fact that the percent-
age of home-owners and the frequency of automobile ownership
were greater among Hormel employees than among the residents of
29 small cities in four regions of the United States.
"These facts support the conclusion that...theultimate effect
was an increase in employment in the community as a whole. More-
over, by stabilizing its own employment and payroll, the Hormel
Company introduced elements into the economy of the city that
made it possible for other enterprises to achieve stability of opera-
tions at a higher level of economic activity.
It is worth noting too that the building trades in Austin have
gone a considerable distance toward overcoming variations in em-
ployment from season to season.
"With respect to the broader economic effects of stabilization, it
is possible to conclude that, if the individual employer can intro-
duce greater stability of operations, the direct and indirect effects
may help greatly to mitigate or to prevent the collapse that is at
present associated with the cyclical downswing."
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Whether these beneficial consequences were caused by the formal
guarantee of wages, or rather by the confidence on the part of the
employees and general community that this company had solved
the instability problem (the solution being symbolized by the
guarantee) could be debated at length.
Whether Chernick's tentative conclusions are acceptable or not,
this study does suggest a point of departure for a methodology that
may be useful in any further studies of the interrelation between
company regularization programs and systemic stability.
Limit8 of Study
The foregoing comment by no means exhausts the scope of man-
agerial discretion that may have contracyclical impact and be
worthy of further exploration. Nor does it include all of the ideas
and suggestions made by respondents to my inquiry.
Largely omitted from discussion are the following: wage policy;
personnel administration; inventory policy with respect to forward
purchases, quantities, and pricing; cost accounting and profit calcu-
lations; depreciation policy; and special financial reserves for lean
years and for smoothing out rates of disbursements.4° In most of
these areas, responses were less frequent and often more vague
and indeterminate. In some of these matters, most of the respondents
either had not experimented much or had not considered them
suiliciently to justify positive conclusions. This was less true in the
cases of better inventory accounting and financial reserves. Several of
these topics come within the purview of other papers prepared for
this conference and, therefore, are much more thoroughly dealt with
than could be the case in this paper. It should be said for the record,
however, that there is a substantial additional inventory of experi-
ence and exploration in the responses that merits further review.
Perhaps it should also be said that, under the program outlined
by the planning committee for the Conference, this paper was in-
tended to explore only the indirect approach to the stabilization of
investment. Other papers deal with a number of theoretical and
systemic issues that will test the direct approach of the individual
firm in its relation to the stabilization of the economy.
40JoelDean, "Measurement of Profits for Executive Decisions," Accounting
Review, April 1951, pp. 185-196, shows the need for a third set of accounts in
meaningful economic terms, without denying the need for statutory and histori-
cal cost accounting. Similar views are put forward in George Terborgh's Infla-
tion and Postwar Profits, Machinery and Allied Products Institute, 1949.
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Conclusions
1. Systematic attempts to make the individual firm less vulnerable
to depression are widespread, and business executives and business
economists believe that considerable progress has been made.
2. The individual company has community, industrial relations,
and public relations problems that it is increasingly inclined to solve
by regularization efforts.
3. In terms of the individual company approach to the regulariza-
tion of investment, the indirect attack through policies of pricing,
product mix, supplementary lines, marketing and salesefforts,
finance, etc. may be fruitful.
4. That these attempts make the economy as a whole more stable
is suggested, but is not wholly clear. Whether they do or do not
depends to a considerable degree on what specific-firm policies are
followed.
5. To some extent,certain individual-company regularization
policies "export" unemployment and instability to other companies.
But in an expanding economy such readjustments, imposed over an
extended period of time, can probably be expected to be absorbed
and may have few adverse systemic effects. Other policies, such as
diversification, may simply reduce the instability of individual-firm
operations without contributing directly to over-all economic sta-
bility.
6. By reducing the vulnerability in depression or the degree of
decline company by company, the cumulative downtrend of a de-
pression may tend to be slowed down and halted. Such lessened vul-
nerability of the individual firm may not only reduce the risk of
outright business failure or serious curtailment but also prevent
panic type reactions that spread among firms and financial insti-
tutions.
7. A combination of company policies suitably adapted case by
case is likely to be more effective than any one policy standing alone.
8. Several desirable company policies may require statutory
changes.
9. The growing understanding among business executives and
their advisors and consultants of the nature of the business cycle
may be a fact of major importance.41
41Aneconomist may be pardoned for attributing significance to the growth
in the employment and use of economists in business. The "Capital Goods
Economics" seminars of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute and the
Economic Institutes of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, con-
ducted over a period of years, have reached hundreds of business executives.
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10. Nothing in this paper should be interpreted as in any way
deemphasizing the essential role that contracyclical fiscal and mone-
tary policy should play.
11. An extensive literature on individual-company policy of both
a theoretical and guidepost character would encourage more experi-
mentation and exploration by the individual company.
12. More research, both in the theory and in the practice of the
individual-firm approach related to the good health of the economy,
would seem desirable.
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